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Introduction
This paper studies the relation between the Bayesian mechanism design approach to the provision and …nancing of public goods and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to public-sector pricing under a government budget constraint. In the tradition of public economics, these two approaches have Final revision of Discussion Paper No. 04-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. I am grateful to Felix Bierbrauer, Hans Gersbach, Roger Guesnerie, Christian Hellwig, Peter Norman, and two referees for helpful discussions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. I also thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for research support through Sonderforschungsbereich 504 at the University of Mannheim.
1 developed separately and focus on di¤erent issues. However, there is an area of overlap. For excludable public goods such as parks and highways, one can charge admission fees and exclude people who do not pay these fees. For such goods, therefore, the question arises what fees are appropriate. This paper investigates the conditions under which the two approaches give the same answer to this question. It also investigates why they might sometimes give di¤erent answers.
The mechanism design approach focuses on the revelation of preferences as a basis determining the level of public-good provision, as well as each participant's …nancial contribution. The Ramsey-Boiteux approach focuses on the tradeo¤ between revenue contributions and e¢ ciency losses associated with di¤erent …nancing instruments. In the mechanism design approach, the form of a payment scheme is determined endogenously, as part of the solution to the given incentive problem. In the Ramsey-Boiteux approach, the form of the payment scheme is taken as given.
However, under some conditions, the subject of enquiry of the two approaches is exactly the same. To see this, consider a large economy in which people have private information about their public-goods preferences (independent private values), but through a large-numbers e¤ect, the crosssection distribution of preferences is …xed and commonly known. In this case, the assessment of alternative levels of public-good provision is unencumbered by information problems. However, any attempt to relate …nancial contributions to the bene…ts that people draw from the public goods is hampered by the fact that information about their preferences is private. If everybody is allowed free access to all public goods, the only incentivecompatible …nancing scheme stipulates equal lump-sum payments from all individuals, whether they bene…t from the public goods or not. Under such a …nancing scheme, people that have no desire for the public goods at all are negatively a¤ected by their provision, and their participation must be based on coercion rather than voluntary agreement. 1 If coercion is to be avoided, one must take recourse to admission fees supported by the possibility of individual exclusion.
Thus, Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) have argued that, to avoid coercion, an excludable public good should be …nanced by admission fees if this is possible. When there is nonrivalry in consumption, admission fees induce an ine¢ ciency, but, in the absence of other sources of funds, this ine¢ ciency is unavoidable if the public good is to be provided at all.
Without coercion, the public good has to be …nanced from payments that people are willing to make in order to enhance their prospects of bene…tting from it. In the large economy, the only such motivation comes from the desire to avoid being excluded, i.e., the willingness to pay for admission. By using admission fees to …nance the public good, one avoids the ine¢ ciency arising from not having the public good at all. Having the public good and excluding the people who are not willing to pay the fee is still better than not having it at all.
The argument is the same as the one that underlies the Ramsey-Boiteux theory of optimal deviations from marginal-cost pricing when …xed costs of production must be recovered. 2 In fact, the distinction between the two speci…cations is merely a matter of semantics. If we think about "access to the public good" as a private good, then the production of this private good involves a …xed cost, namely the cost of installing the public good, and zero variable costs.
This connection deepens our understanding of both approaches. Regarding the analysis of Bayesian mechanisms, one learns that the imposition of interim participation constraints (in addition to feasibility) is equivalent to the imposition of a "government budget constraint" with a ban on lumpsum taxation. Regarding the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis, one learns that, when there is a single excludable public good, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing can be identi…ed with a second-best incentive mechanism. Whereas the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis takes the form of the payment scheme -and thereby the form of the allocation mechanism -as given, the analysis of Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) shows that the Ramsey-Boiteux solution cannot be improved upon, even if one allows for more general payment schemes and allocation mechanisms. In particular, nothing is to be gained by allowing for the possibility of providing people with lotteries over admissions and having them pay in accordance with the admission probabilities that are generated by the lotteries.
The case of multiple public goods is more interesting. For a single excludable public good, the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis implies only that, if the public good is provided at all, then the admission fee should be set equal to the lowest value at which provision costs can be covered. 3 For multiple excludable public goods, there is an additional degree of freedom because the government budget constraint requires only that total revenues cover total costs. This constraint allows for the possibility of cross-subsidization between the di¤erent public goods, a possibility that has traditionally not been considered in the analysis of public-good provision. This paper shows that, when there are multiple excludable public goods, the Bayesian mechanism design approach and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach are equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the …nal allocation of private goods and of admission tickets for the excludable public goods is required to satisfy a condition of renegotiation proofness. An allocation satis…es this condition if it does not leave any room for Pareto improvements through incentive-compatible side-trading among the participants.
The new equivalence result further deepens our understanding of both approaches. For the mechanism design approach to public-goods provision, one learns that cross-subsidization between public goods may be useful. Traditional models of a single public good do not make room for this possibility. Such models therefore miss an important aspect of the problem, important, that is, in a second-best world where public-goods …nance must not rely on coercion.
The equivalence result of this paper also shows that, for multiple public goods, the Ramsey-Boiteux approach is in an important way more restrictive than the general second-best mechanism design approach. In assuming that payments are given by a vector of admission fees, the Ramsey-Boiteux approach excludes many mechanisms a priori, mechanisms that involve lotteries, as well as mechanisms that involve bundling, e.g., a mechanism that provides combination tickets to an opera performance and a football match at a discount relative to the prices of the separate tickets. The mechanisms that are thus excluded are important because, by contrast to the case of a single public good, they tend to dominate the Ramsey-Boiteux solution. Such mechanisms are, however, vulnerable to side-trading among the participants.
If the mechanism designer is unable to prevent people from frictionless side-trading, the allocation of private goods and of admission tickets for the excludable public goods that he stipulates will be the …nal one if and only if it is renegotiation-proof, i.e., it does not leave any room for incentivecompatible, Pareto-improving trades among the participants. In the large economy, this renegotiation proofness condition is satis…ed if and only if the …nal allocation of private goods and of admission tickets for public goods is Walrasian. The associated price vector is precisely the vector of consumer prices that the Ramsey-Boiteux theory is concerned with. A Bayesian mechanism that satis…es renegotiation proofness, as well as interim incentive compatibility and individual rationality, is thus identi…ed with a vector of admission prices. The mechanism design problem then is equivalent to the corresponding Ramsey-Boiteux problem.
In this problem, a vector of optimal admission fees must satisfy a version of the well-known inverse-elasticities rule, i.e., across the di¤erent public goods, markups over marginal costs (zero) must be inversely proportional to the elasticities of demand. Given this rule, there usually is crosssubsidization between the public goods, i.e., there is no presumption that, for any one of them, admission fee revenues just cover costs.
Admission fee revenues on excludable public goods can also be used to …nance nonexcludable public goods. This cross-subsidization eliminates the problem identi…ed by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that, in a large economy with private information, the provision of nonexcludable public goods cannot be …nanced at all without coercion. The inverse-elasticities rule for excludable public goods is una¤ected.
If renegotiation proofness is not imposed, a second-best mechanism can require pure or mixed bundling and even a randomization of admissions. Norman (2003/2006 ) have shown that under certain assumptions about the underlying data, the Ramsey-Boiteux solution sometimes is dominated by a mechanism involving pure bundling in the sense that consumers are o¤ered admission to all public goods at once or to none. This paper shows that, if the valuations for the di¤erent public goods are stochastically independent, then a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. a scheme where bundles of public goods come at a discount relative to their individual components, always dominates the optimal renegotiation-proof mechanism, i.e. the optimal Ramsey-Boiteux solution. The reason is that the demand for a bundle is more elastic than the demands for the individual components. A discount on the bundle is therefore mandated by the very logic that underlies the inverse-elasticities rule of the Ramsey-Boiteux approach itself. The result parallels similar results of McAfee et al. (1989) and Manelli and Vincent (2006 a) for a multiproduct monopoly. It implies that the requirement of renegotiation proofness is necessary, as well as su¢ cient, for the applicability of the Ramsey-Boiteux approach.
Altogether, the analysis combines three ideas. First, the combination of interim participation and feasibility constraints in the Bayesian mechanism design problem with private information is equivalent to the imposition of a "government budget constraint" à la Ramsey-Boiteux. Second, with frictionless side-trading, the …nal allocation in the large economy must be Walrasian, i.e. supported by a price system which does not leave any room for arbitrage. Third, if side-trading is infeasible, mixed bundling can be used to raise pro…ts. Each of these ideas has been around before: The equivalence of interim participation constraints and the "government budget constraint"is pointed out in Hellwig (2003) . The constraints that frictionless side-trading imposes on mechanism design have been studied by Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , 1987 and Guesnerie (1995) . In the multiproduct monopoly literature, the advantages of mixed bundling have been pointed out by McAfee et al. (1989) and Manelli and Vincent (2006 a) . This paper's contribution is to pull these ideas together for a precise characterization of the relation between the Ramsey-Boiteux approach and the Bayesian mechanism design approach to the provision and …nancing of multiple excludable public goods.
The Ramsey-Boiteux approach itself has been criticized by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) because it ignores the possibility of raising funds through from lump sum taxes or income taxes and because, therefore, the government budget constraint that it imposes induces unnecessary ine¢ ciencies. In principle, this critique also applies in the context of public-good provision. 4 However, in the context of public-goods provision, it is natural to assume that di¤erent people have di¤erent preferences and that their preferences are their private information. After all, this is the essence of the standard mechanism design problem for public-goods provision. When this assumption is imposed, the Atkinson-Stiglitz critique necessitates the government's using its powers of coercion so that even people who don't bene…t from the public goods at all are made to pay the taxes. 5 The use of coercion to levy contributions from people who do not bene…t from the public goods at all raises concerns about equity as well as the possibility of power abuse. 6 The use of coercion is also incompatible with the contractarian approach to government that stood behind Lindahl's (1919) development of the theory of public goods. 7 Given that governments usually do have a power of coercion, Lindahl's approach may seem unrealistic. Even so, there is some interest in understanding its implications. One may also wish to follow Boiteux (1956) and look at a self-…nancing requirement for providers of public goods as a way to avoid the (unmodelled) adverse the possibility of individual randomization in public-good admissions and private-good consumption.
The random variables~ h and! h are assumed to be independent. Their distributions F and are assumed to be the same for all agents. Moreover, the distribution F of the vector~ h of preference parameters has a strictly positive, continuously di¤erentiable density f ( ). For i = 1; :::m; the marginal distribution of~ i ; the i-th component of the random vector~ ; is denoted as F i , its density as f i :
The set of participants is modelled as an atomless measure space (H; H; ): I assume a large-numbers e¤ect whereby the cross-section distribution of the pair (~ h (x);! h (x)) in the population is P -almost surely equal to the probability distribution F . Thus, for almost every x 2 X; I postulate that
for every F -integrable function ' from [0; 1] m+1 into <: 8 I restrict the analysis to allocations that satisfy an ex-ante neutrality or anonymity condition. The level c h of an individual's private-good consumption and the set J h of public goods to which the individual is admitted are assumed to depend on h and on the state of the world x only through the realizations~ h (x) = h and! h (x) = ! h of the random variables~ h and! h :
In principle, c h and J h should also depend on the cross-section distribution of the other agents'parameter realizations~ h 0 (x) = h 0 and! h 0 (x) = ! h 0 in the population, but because this cross-section distribution is constant and independent of x, there is no need to make this dependence explicit. This is a major advantage of working with the large-economy speci…cation with the law of large numbers.
An allocation is thus de…ned as an array The indicator A i ( ; !) takes the value one if the consumer is given access and the value zero, if he is not given access to public good i:
The economy has an exogenous production capacity permitting the aggregate consumption Y of the private good if no public goods are provided. If a vector Q of public-good provision levels is to be provided, an aggregate amount K(Q) of private-good consumption must be foregone. An allocation is feasible if
for almost every x 2 X, so the sum of aggregate consumption and publicgood provision costs does not exceed Y: By the large-numbers condition (2.2), this requirement is equivalent to the inequality Z
The cost function K( ) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with K(0) = 0, and with partial derivatives K i ( ) such that lim k!1 K i (Q k ) = 0 for any sequence fQ k g with lim k!1 Q k i = 0 and lim k!1 K i (Q k ) = 1 for any sequence fQ k g with lim k!1 Q k i = 1: The allocation (Q; c( ; ); 1 ( ; ); :::; m ( ; )) provides consumer h with the ex ante expected payo¤ Z
Because of the ex ante neutrality property of allocations, (2.6) is independent of h: All participants are therefore in agreement about the ex ante ranking of allocations. Taking this ranking as a normative standard, I refer to an allocation as being …rst-best if it maximizes (2.6) over the set of feasible allocations. By (2.2), the ex ante expected payo¤ for any one participant is equal to the aggregate per capita payo¤
for almost every x 2 X: A …rst-best allocation therefore is also best if the mechanism designer is concerned with this cross-section aggregate of payo¤s in the population. In taking (2.7) or (2.6) to be a suitable welfare indicator, I implicitly assume that there is no risk aversion on the side of participants and no inequality aversion on the side of the mechanism designer.
First-Best Allocations, Incentive Compatibility, and Individual Rationality
In a slightly more compact notation, the …rst-best welfare problem is to choose an allocation so as to maximize Z
are the conditional expectations of a consumer's private-good consumption and admission probability for public good i; given the information that~ h = .
By standard arguments, one obtains:
1 An allocation is …rst-best if and only if it satis…es the feasibility condition (2.5) with equality and, for i = 1; :::; m; one has
and i ( ) = 1 for almost all 2 [0; 1] m : 9 9 If there was risk aversion on the side of consumers or inequality aversion on the side of the mechanism designer, the conditions of Lemma 2.1 would have to be augmented by a condition equating the social marginal utility of private-good consumption across agents. For details, see Hellwig (2005 Hellwig ( , 2004 .
In a …rst-best allocation, the ability to exclude people from the enjoyment of a public good is never used. Moreover, the levels of public-good provision are chosen so that, for each i, the marginal cost K i (Q) of increasing the level at which public good i is provided is equal to the aggregate marginal bene…ts that consumers in the economy draw from the increase. Given the assumption that lim k!1 K i (Q k ) = 0 for any i and any sequence fQ k g with lim k!1 Q k i = 0; it follows that, in a …rst-best allocation, provision levels of all public goods are positive, and so is K(Q):
Turning to the speci…cation of information, I assume that each consumer knows the realization of his own preference parameter vector, but, about the random variable!; he knows nothing beyond the measure : The information about is private. Apart from the distribution F , nobody knows anything about the pair (~ ;!) pertaining to somebody else. Given this information speci…cation, an allocation is said to be incentive-compatible if and only if, for all and
From Rochet (1987) , one has Lemma 2.2 An allocation is incentive-compatible if and only if the expected-payo¤ function v( ) that is given by (2.14) is convex and has partial deriva-
for all i and almost all 2 [0; 1] m :
For a …rst-best allocation, with i ( ) = 1 for almost all 2 [0; 1] m ; (2.15) is equivalent to the requirement that C( ) be independent of : From Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, one therefore obtains:
for almost all 2 [0; 1] m : Proposition 2.3 indicates that, in the large economy studied here, a …rstbest allocation can be implemented if and only if public-good provision is entirely …nanced by a lump-sum payment, which people make regardless of their preferences. 10 This lump-sum payment amounts to K(Q) > 0 per person. Public-goods provision then hurts people who do not care for the public goods and bene…ts people who care a lot for them. People who do not care for the public goods are strictly worse o¤ than they would be if they could just have the private-good consumption Y .
To articulate this concern formally, I introduce a concept of individual rationality. I assume that each participant h has the capacity to produce Y units of the private good (at no further cost to himself) and that, without any agreement on the provision of public goods, each participant simply consumes these Y units of the private good out of his own production. Given this assumption, an allocation is said to be individually rational if the expected payo¤ (2.14) satis…es v( ) Y for all 2 [0; 1] m : 11 With this de…nition, Proposition 2.3 implies that a …rst-best, incentive-compatible allocation cannot be individually rational. Indeed, any incentive-compatible allocation with K(Q) > 0 and i ( ) = 1 for almost all 2 [0; 1] m fails to be individually rational. 12 This result does not depend on either the exogeneity of production or the homogeneity of individuals. Whenever the government refrains from using taxes on people's production capacities or people's outputs to …nance the public goods, the impossibility result goes through without change.
The assumption that public-goods provision is not …nanced from taxes on production capacities or production activities stands in the tradition of Lindahl (1919) . Lindahl's (1919) creation of the theory of public goods was designed as an interpretation of government activities in terms of voluntary exchanges, culminating the development of the bene…t approach to public …nance as part of a theory of the state built on contracts. In Lindahl's 1 0 This result is moot if participants are risk averse or the mechanism designer is inequality averse. In this case, (2.16) is incompatible with the requirement that the social marginal utility of private-good consumption be equalized across agents. See Hellwig (2005 Hellwig ( , 2004 . 1 1 This speci…cation encompasses the requirement that nobody should have an incentive to reject the proposed allocation in order to consume his own output Y and at the same time to enjoy the public goods provided by others? If one combines the incentive compatibility condition (2.13) for any and 0 = 0 with the participation constraint v(0) Y;
which is precisely the requirement in question. 1 2 These observations provide a large-economy, multiple-public-goods extension of the …nite-economy, single-public-good impossibility theorems of Güth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989) analysis, the government was considered to be …rst providing for equity through redistribution and then providing for e¢ cient public-goods provision through voluntary contracting on a do-ut-des basis. The voluntariness of exchange at the second stage of government activity corresponds precisely to the individual-rationality condition introduced here. 13 
The Problem of the Second-Best
A second-best allocation is de…ned as an allocation that maximizes the aggregate surplus (2.8) over the set of all feasible, incentive-compatible and individually rational allocations. As discussed by Rochet and Choné (1998) , the problem of …nding such an allocation can be formulated in terms of the provision levels Q 1 ; :::; Q m and the expected-payo¤ function v A ( ): Lemma 2.2 implies that, for any Q = (Q 1 ; :::; Q m ) and any convex function v( ) with partial derivatives satisfying v i ( ) 2 [0; Q i ] for all i and almost all 2 [0; 1] m ; an incentive-compatible allocation is obtained by setting
and specifying c A ( : ) and A 1 ( : ); :::; A m ( : ) accordingly. By (2.19), (2.5) is equivalent to the inequality
The problem of …nding a second-best allocation is therefore equivalent to the problem of choosing Q and a convex function v with partial derivatives satisfying v i ( ) 2 [0; Q i ] for all i and almost all so as to maximize (2.8) subject to (2.20) and the participation constraint v( ) Y for all : For a single excludable public good, i.e., when m = 1; Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) have shown that this problem has a simple solution: For any second-best allocation (Q; c( ; ); 1 ( ; )), there is some^ 2 (0; 1) such that C( ) = Y; ( ) = 0 for <^ and C( ) = Y ^ Q; ( ) = 1 for >^ : There is a user fee p =^ Q; so that people for whom the bene…t Q from the enjoyment of the public good exceeds p pay the fee and are given access, and people for whom the bene…t Q is less than p do not pay the fee and are not given access. The critical^ and the fee p =^ Q are chosen so that the aggregate revenue p(1 F (^ )) just covers the cost K(Q) of providing the public good. 14 For m > 1; a general characterization of second-best allocations does not seem to be available. As usual in problems of multi-dimensional mechanism design, the second-order conditions for incentive compatibility (convexity of the expected-payo¤ function v( )) and integrability conditions (equality of the cross derivatives v ij ( ) and v ji ( ); i.e. of the derivatives @ i ( ) @ j Q i and @ j ( ) @ i Q j ) are di¢ cult to handle analytically. For the case of two excludable public goods, i.e., m = 2; with independent preference parameters having identical two-point distributions, a complete characterization of second-best allocations in …nite economies is provided by Norman (2003/2006 ). The large-economy limits of these allocations involve nonseparability and genuine randomization in admission rules. The complexity of the particular admission rules that they obtain may be due to their working with a two-point distribution of preference parameters. 15 However, the work of Thanassoulis (2004) , as well as Manelli and Vincent (2006 a, b) on the closely related problem of pro…t maximization by a multi-product monopolist suggests that, for m > 1; nonseparability and genuine randomization in admissions are the rule, rather than the exception. 16 1 4 If the function ! g( ) :=
is increasing, the solution is actually unique. If the function ! g( ) is not increasing, there may be more than one solution, including solutions that involve randomized admissions. However, even in this case, at least one solution has the simple interpretation in terms of an entry fee that is given in the text; see Manelli and Vincent (2006 b ).
Renegotiation Proofness and the Optimality of Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing
The price characterization of second-best mechanisms that Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) have provided for the case of a single public good relate the mechanism design problem to the Ramsey-Boiteux tradition of publicsector pricing. The admission fee that characterizes a second-best mechanism is in fact the same as the second-best price in the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis, the lowest price at which the costs of public-goods provision are covered.
With multiple public goods, it is usually not possible to characterize second-best allocations by admission fees. In this case, the question of what is the relation between the second-best mechanism design problem and Ramsey-Boiteux pricing seems moot. Instead of pursuing this question, I therefore consider third-best allocations, de…ned as allocations that maximize aggregate surplus subject to feasibility, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and an additional condition of renegotiation proofness.
The latter condition re ‡ects the idea that the agency which implements the chosen mechanism is unable to verify the identities of people who present tickets for access to the enjoyment of a public good. In particular, the agency is unable to check whether the people who present tickets for access to a public good are in fact the same people to whom the tickets have been issued. It is also unable to prevent people from trading these tickets, as well as the private good, among each other. If the initial allocation of tickets leaves room for a Pareto improvement through such trading, then, as discussed by Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , 1987 and Guesnerie (1995) , in the absence of transactions costs, such trading will occur, and the initial allocation will not actually be the …nal allocation.
Underlying the imposition of renegotiation proofness is the notion that, regardless of the allocation that is initially chosen by the mechanism designer, in the absence of transactions costs, any allocation that is …nally implemented will itself be renegotiation proof. If the mechanism designer is aware of the possibility of renegotiation, and if he cares about the allocation that is …nally implemented rather than the one that is initially chosen, his choice may be directly expressed in terms of the …nal renegotiation-proof allocation. Indeed if he chooses a renegotiation proof allocation from the beginning, this initial allocation will also be the …nal allocation. Given these considerations, I refer to an allocation as third-best if and only if it maximizes the aggregate surplus (2.8) over the set of all feasible, incentive-compatible, individually rational, and renegotiation proof allocations. 17 To de…ne renegotiation proofness formally, I say that a net-trade allocation for private-good consumption and public-good admission tickets is an array (z c ( ; ); z 1 ( ; ); :::; z m ( ; )) such that for each ( ; !); z c ( ; !) and z 1 ( ; !); ::; z m ( ; !) are the net additions to private-good consumption and holdings of public-good admission tickets of a consumer with preference parameter vector and indicator value !. Given the initial allocation (2.3), a net-trade allocation (z c ( ; ); z 1 ( ; ); ::
for i = c; 1; :::; m and almost all x 2 X; which by (2.2) is equivalent to the requirement that Z 
for all and 0 in [0; 1] m and all ! and ! 0 in for which i ( ; !)+z i ( 0 ; ! 0 ) 2 f0; 1g for all i. The idea is that the holdings (c( ; !); 1 ( ; !); :::; m ( ; !)) of private-good consumption and public-goods admission tickets of a given agent, as well as the realization ( ; !) of his preference parameter vector~ and randomization device! are not known by anybody else. 19 Therefore, if the agent claims that his preference parameter vector is 0 ; he obtains the net trade (z c ( 0 ; ! 0 ); z 1 ( 0 ; ! 0 ); :::; z m ( 0 ; ! 0 )) that is available to an agent with parameter vector 0 when his randomization variable takes the value ! 0 . Incentive compatibility of the net-trade allocation requires that such a claim not provide the agent with an improvement over the stipulated net trade (z c ( ; !); z 1 ( ; !); :::; z m ( ; !)):
An allocation is said to be renegotiation proof if, starting from it, there is no feasible and incentive-compatible net-trade allocation that provides a Pareto improvement in the sense that for all ( ; !) 2 [0; 1] m+1 ; the utility gain from the net trade (z c ( ; !); z 1 ( ; !); :::; z m ( ; !)) is nonnegative, i.e.
(3.4) and the aggregate utility gain is strictly positive, i.e.,
with positive probability; by (2.2), the latter inequality is equivalent to to the inequality
which actually implies that (3.5) holds with probability one. As introduced here, the concept of renegotiation proofness presumes that tickets to all public goods can be traded separately. A weaker concept of renegotiation proofness would be obtained if the mechanism designer were unable to prevent sidetrading, but able to prepare tickets to bundles of public goods in such a way that unbundling is impossible. This weaker concept is brie ‡y discussed at the end of Section 4 and in Appendix B.
For the strong concept introduced here, the following lemma shows that renegotiation proofness holds if and only if there exists a price system which supports the allocation as a competitive equilibrium of the exchange economy in which people trade the private good, as well as admission tickets for the di¤erent public goods, taking the vector Q of public-good provision levels as given. ; one has
Renegotiation proofness implies, for each public good i, a simple dichotomy between a set of participants with high i , who get admission to public good i with probability one, and a set of participants with low i ; who do not get admission to public good i: This leaves no room for randomized admissions.
The simplicity of the admission rule in Lemma 3.1 provides for a drastic simpli…cation of incentive compatibility conditions. The numbers p 1 ; :::; p m can be interpreted as prices, i.e., as admission fees. In an incentive-compatible allocation, a consumer is granted access to public good i if and only if he pays the fee p i : Consumers with i Q i > p i pay the fee and enjoy the public good for a net bene…t equal to i Q i p i ; consumers with i Q i < p i do not pay the fee and are excluded from the public good. Formally, one obtains: 
and
The associated expected payo¤ is
For any incentive-compatible and renegotiation proof allocation, the aggregate surplus (2.8) and the feasibility constraint (2.5) take the form
where p 1 ; :::; p m are the competitive prices associated with the allocation and, for any i;
The problem of …nding a third-best allocation is therefore equivalent to the problem of choosing an expected base consumption C(0); as well as publicgood provision levels Q 1 ; :::; Q m ; and prices p 1 ; :::; p m , with associated critical preference parameter values^ 1 ; :::;^ m satisfying^ i Q i = p i ; so as to maximize (3.13) subject to the feasibility constraint (3.14) and the participation constraint C(0) Y:
In this maximization, the participation constraint is binding. Otherwise the problem would be solved by the incentive-compatible …rst-best allocation of Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.3, which is obviously renegotiation proof, but violates the participation constraint.
Given that the participation constraint is binding, the base consumption C(0) in (3.13) and (3.14) can be replaced by the constant Y; and one obtains:
The third-best allocation problem is equivalent to the problem of choosing public-good provision levels Q 1 ; :::; Q m and prices p 1 ; :::; p m so as to maximize
The problem of …nding a third-best allocation has thus been reformulated solely in terms of the public-good provision levels and prices. Given the fees p 1 ; :::p m ; for any i; there are (1 F i (^ i (p i ; Q i ))) participants with i Q i who are willing to pay the fee p i for access to public good i: The aggregate admission fee revenue from public good i is therefore p i (1 F i (^ i (p i ; Q i ))); and the aggregate admission fee revenue from all public goods is
). The constraint (3.17) requires that this revenue cover the cost K(Q): Proposition 3.3 provides an analogue to Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , 1987 and Guesnerie (1995) , where the possibility of unrestricted side-trading reduces the general problem of mechanism design for optimal taxation to a Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) problem of …nding optimal consumer prices. Here, the thirdbest allocation problem is equivalent to the Ramsey-Boiteux problem of choosing public-good provision levels and prices so as to maximize aggregate surplus under the constraint that admission fee revenues be su¢ cient to cover the costs of public-good provision. Because individual-rationality constraints preclude the imposition of lump-sum taxes, the costs of public-good provision must be fully …nanced by payments that people make in order to gain the bene…ts of the public goods. Renegotiation proofness implies that these payments are characterized by admission fees p 1 ; :::; p m ; as they are in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to public-sector service provision and pricing.
The equivalence stated in Proposition 3.3 indicates that the di¤erence between the allocation problem for an excludable public good and the allocation problem for a good whose production involves signi…cant …xed costs is purely one of semantics: The enjoyment of the public good by any one individual can be treated as a private good, the production of which involves only a …xed cost and no variable costs.
The following characterization of third-best allocations in terms of …rstorder conditions is now straightforward. Proposition 3.4 If Q 1 ; :::; Q m ; and p 1 ; :::; p m are the public-good provision levels and admission fees in a third-best allocation, then Q i > p i > 0 for i = 1; :::; m; moreover, there exists > 1; such that
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for i = 1; :::; m; where^ i =^ i (p i ; Q i ) is given by (3.15 ).
20
Condition (3.19) is the usual Ramsey-Boiteux condition for "secondbest"consumer prices. The term (1 F i ( p i Q i )) on the right-hand side indicates the level of aggregate demand for admissions to public good i when the price is p i and the "quality", i.e., the provision level, is Q i : The term f i ( p i Q i ) 1 Q i on the left-hand side indicates the absolute value of the derivative of demand with respect to p i : Condition (3.19) requires admission fees to be chosen in such a way that the elasticities
of demands for admissions to the di¤erent public goods are locally all the same, i.e. that
= 1
i for all i: This is the degenerate form taken by the Ramsey-Boiteux inverseelasticities formula when variable costs are identically equal to zero. 20 Condition (3.18) is the version of the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for public-good provision that is appropriate for the third-best allocation problem. 21 Third-best public-good provision levels are determined so that for each i; the marginal cost of providing public good i is equated to a weighted average of the aggregate marginal bene…ts that are obtained by users and the aggregate marginal revenues that are obtained by the mechanism designer if the admission fee p i is raised in proportion to Q i so that the critical i (p i ; Q i ) is unchanged. If provision costs are additively separable, i.e., if the marginal cost K i (Q) depends only on Q i ; then each of of the third-best provision levels Q 1 ; :::; Q m will be lower than the corresponding …rst-best level given by (2.12) . The reason is, …rst, that there are fewer users of the public good than in the …rst-best allocation, and second, that the mechanism designer is unable to fully appropriate the bene…ts from additional public-good provision so that the aggregate marginal revenues accruing to him are less than the aggregate marginal bene…ts accruing to users. The analysis is easily extended to a situation with nonexcludable as well as excludable public goods. Suppose, for example, that n < m public goods 1; :::; n are nonexcludable and public goods n+1; :::; m are excludable. Nonexcludability of a public good i is equivalent to the requirement that the admission probability i ( ) be equal to one for all : In terms of the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis, this in turn is equivalent to the requirement that the admission fee for this public good be equal to zero. The third-best allocation problem then is to maximize (3.16) subject to (3.17 ) and the constraint that p i = 0 for i = 1; :::; n: Except for the fact that admission fees for nonexcludable public goods are zero, the conditions for a third-best allocation are the same as before, i.e., admission fees for excludable public goods satisfy an inverse-elasticities formula, and provision levels for all public goods satisfy an appropriate version of the Lindahl-Samuelson condition.
For the nonexcludable public goods, the Lindahl-Samuelson condition takes the form 1
so, by the same reasoning as before, a third-best allocation also involves strictly positive provision levels of nonexcludable public goods. In the large economy, provision of the nonexcludable public goods does not generate any revenue, but they are provided nevertheless. Admission fees from the excludable public goods provide …nance for the nonexcludable public goods as well. This cross-subsidization is desirable because, with R 1 0 i dF i ( i ) > 0 and K i (Q) = 0 when Q i = 0; the bene…ts of the …rst (in…nitesimal) unit that is provided always exceed the costs. This …nding is una¤ected by the fact that the cross-subsidization of nonexcludable public goods requires higher admission fees and creates additional distortions for excludable public goods. Concern about these additional distortions will reduce but not eliminate the provision of nonexcludable public goods. 22 This discussion of nonexcludable public goods stands in contrast to the assessment of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that, in a large economy with asymmetric information and interim participation constraints, a nonexcludable public good will not be provided at all. The Mailath-Postlewaite result presumes a single nonexcludable public good, the costs of which have to be covered by revenues coming from this very public good itself. Here there is no such requirement. Interim participation constraints for individual consumers and the induced aggregate budget (feasibility) constraint allow for cross-subsidization between public goods. For nonexcludable public goods, this cross-subsidization eliminates the Mailath-Postlewaite problem.
The cross-subsidization of nonexcludable public goods can be seen as an instance of the well known general principle that, in the Ramsey-Boiteux framework, there is no presumption that any one good should be self-…nancing. Even if the cost function K( ) is additively separable and there is no ambiguity in assessing the cost of providing public good i at a level Q i , there is still no presumption that this cost K i (Q i ) should be altogether covered by the revenue p i (1 F i (^ i (p i ; Q i ))) that is attributable to this particular public good. 23 
Mixed Bundling Dominates Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing
In the preceding analysis, the requirement of renegotiation proofness has served to reduce a complex problem of multidimensional mechanism design to a simple m-dimensional pricing problem. The key to this simpli…cation lies in the observation that renegotiation proofness restricts admission rules so that the expected-payo¤ function v( ) takes the form (3.12), which is additively separable and convex in 1 ; :::; m . The integrability condition v A ij = v A ji and the second-order condition for incentive compatibility (convexity) are then automatically satis…ed.
However, renegotiation proofness is restrictive. If the mechanism designer is able to control the identities of people presenting admission tickets to the di¤erent public goods, or if there are some impediments to renegotiation, an optimal allocation will typically not have the simple structure that is implied by renegotiation proofness. Second-best allocations, which maximize aggregate surplus subject to feasibility, incentive compatibility and individual rationality, without renegotiation proofness, tend to involve bundling and, possibly, randomized admissions. These devices reduce the e¢ ciency losses that are associated with the use of admission fees to reduce the participants'information rents.
Thus, Norman (2003/2006 ) have noted that, if the random variables~ 1 ; :::;~ m are independent and identically distributed, the weighted sum P m i=1~ i Q i has a lower coe¢ cient of variation than any one of its summands, and therefore, under certain additional assumptions about the distribution of~ i ; an allocation involving pure bundling can dominate a thirdbest allocation because it involves a lower incidence of participants being excluded. 24 Pure bundling refers to a situation where participants are admitted either to all public goods at once or to none.
In the following, I show that, if~ 1 ; :::;~ m are mutually independent, a third-best allocation is always dominated by an allocation involving mixed bundling, i.e., an allocation where participants can obtain admission to each public good separately, as well as admission to di¤erent public goods at the same time, through a combination ticket which comes at a discount relative to the individual tickets. Even if tastes for the di¤erent public goods are completely unrelated, the allocation that is induced by the best pricing scheme à la Ramsey-Boiteux is dominated by some other allocation with nonrandom admission rules. Renegotiation proofness is necessary, as well as su¢ cient, for Ramsey-Boiteux pricing to be equivalent to optimal mechanism design under interim incentive compatibility and individual-rationality constraints. This …nding complements the results of (4.1) for all probability vectors q on P(M ): The idea is that, for the given Q and P; each consumer is free to choose a set J of public goods that he wants to enjoy at a price P (J). He may also randomize this choice. For generic price schedules though, there is a single set J P ( ) which he strictly prefers to all others; in this case, the incentive compatibility condition (4.1) becomes q P (J P ( ); ) = 1; i.e., he simply chooses the set J P ( ):
A price schedule P is said to be arbitrage free if it satis…es the equation
for all J; so each set J M is priced as the sum of its components. One easily veri…es that, if an allocation is induced by an arbitrage-free price schedule P; then it is also renegotiation proof and incentive-compatible, with associated prices p j = P (fjg); j = 1; :::; m: Conversely, an allocation that renegotiation proof and incentive-compatible, with associated prices p 1 ; :::; p m ; is induced by the arbitrage-free price schedule P satisfying
for any J M:
The set of renegotiation proof and incentive-compatible allocations is thus a proper subset of the set allocations that are induced by any price schedules. However, this set does not include allocations that are induced by price schedules with discounts for bundles of public goods, i.e. with P (J) < P j2J p j for some J M: Such allocations leave room for Pareto-improving renegotiations. For instance, a person who found it barely worthwhile to buy the combination ticket for J could gain by reselling its di¤erent components to di¤erent people, each of whom cares for only one public good j, but has not bought the separate ticket to this public good because the price p j is just a little bit too high.
Given that the set of renegotiation-proof and incentive-compatible allocations is a strict subset of the set of allocations induced by price schedules, it is of interest to compare optimal price schedules with the arbitrage-free price schedules that correspond to third-best allocations and optimal Ramsey-Boiteux prices. For an allocation that is induced by a price schedule, the resulting payo¤s are given as
Given a vector Q >> 0 of public-good provision levels; the price schedule P is said to be optimal if it maximizes the aggregate surplus Z
over the set of all price schedules.
The following result shows that, if the preference parameters~ 1 ; :::;~ m are independent, an optimal price schedule is never arbitrage free, so a thirdbest allocation is always dominated by another allocation. In particular, a third-best allocation is always dominated by an allocation that is induced by a price schedule with mixed bundling, e.g., an o¤er involving combination tickets for an opera performance and a football game at a discount relative to the sum of the prices for separate tickets. For any Q >> 0, an optimal price schedule is not arbitrage free. In particular, if p 1 ; :::; p m are the admission fees associated with a third-best allocation, there exists a price scheduleP satisfyingP (M ) < P m j=1 p j andP (fjg) > p j for j = 1; :::; m such that, given Q; the allocation that is induced byP is feasible and individually rational and generates a higher aggregate surplus than the third-best allocation: 26 for a multiproduct monopolist. In principle, the choice of a price schedule P ( ) involves the same elasticities considerations as the choice of a price vector (p 1 ; :::; p m ) in the Ramsey-Boiteux analysis of the preceding section. However, these considerations are now applied to the prices of bundles, as well as the prices of separate admission tickets. The relevant elasticities are therefore di¤erent. Moreover, one must take account of cross-elasticities between combination tickets and separate admission tickets.
Two e¤ects are particularly important. First, the demand for a bundle is likely to be more elastic than the demands for the components of the bundle under Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. The e¤ect is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . Both …gures concern the case m = 2; Q 1 = Q 2 = 1; under the assumption that the price schedule is initially arbitrage free. At this price schedule, the admission ticket to public good 1 is purchased by anybody with 1 > p 1 ; the admission ticket to public good 2 by anybody with 2 > p 2 : People with 1 > p 1 and 2 > p 2 buy admission tickets to both public goods.
The shaded area in Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of a decrease in the admission price p 2 for public good 2 under arbitrage-free pricing; the shaded area in Figure 2 the e¤ects of a decrease in the bundle price P (f1; 2g) from p 1 + p 2 to p 1 + p 2 ; while P (f1g) and P (f2g) remain …xed at p 1 and Figure 2 : E¤ects of a price decrease for the bundle f1; 2g
The price decrease considered in Figure 1 gains customers for good 2 on one margin, people with 2 2 (p 2 ; p 2 ); who previously did not buy an admission ticket for good 2. By contrast, the price decrease considered in Figure 2 gains customers for the bundle on two margins, people with 2 2 (p 2 ; p 2 ); who previously only bought tickets for public good 1 and people with 1 2 (p 1 ; p 1 ); who previously only bought tickets for public good 2. 27 To be sure, these gains of customers for the bundle are accompanied by losses of customers for the separate tickets. However, the net e¤ects are still positive. The people who previously only bought tickets for public good 1 and now buy the combination ticket pay an additional amount p 2 p 2 ; the people who previously only bought tickets for public good 2 and now buy the combination ticket pay an additional amount p 1 p 1 : As usual, the assessment of these price decreases depends on how the revenue gains from having additional customers compare to the revenue losses from charging existing customers less. In each case, this comparison depends on the relation between the size of the group of customers one gains and the size of the group of customers one already has. If the density f takes the form (4.6); then in Figure 1 , the size of the group of customers gained is approximately f 2 (p 2 ); and the size of the group of customers one already has is approximately (1 F 2 (p 2 )): The corresponding revenue e¤ects are approximately p 2 f 2 (p 2 ) and the sizes of the groups that switch are approximately f 2 (p 2 )(1 F 1 (p 1 )) and f 1 (p 1 )(1 F 2 (p 2 )); the total revenue gain from attracting additional customers to the combination ticket is approximately equal to
The existing customer base to which the price reduction applies is of size (1 F 1 (p 1 ))(1 F 2 (p 2 )); and the revenue loss from charging these people a lower price is (1 F 1 (p 1 ))(1 F 2 (p 2 )): (4.8)
From (4.7) and (4.8), one immediately sees that the ratio of revenue gains to revenue losses from a price decrease is more favourable for the bundle than the corresponding ratio p 2 f 2 (p 2 )=(1 F 2 (p 2 )) for arbitrage-free pricing. The independence assumption (4.6) guarantees that elasticities considerations concerning people who react to the price decrease by adding public good 2 to the things they want are the same in both settings; the additional consideration -that there are also people who react to the price decrease by adding public good 2 to the things they want -comes on top of that, making a price decrease for the bundle appear attractive even when a decrease in p 2 under arbitrage-free pricing is not. Second, because of cross-elasticities considerations, the e¤ects of raising the price P (fjg) for separate admission to a single public good j are likely to be less harmful than the e¤ects of raising the Ramsey-Boiteux price p j : The argument is illustrated in Figure 3 . For the same initial arbitrage-free price constellation as in Figures 1 and 2 , this …gure shows the e¤ects of an increase in the price P (f2g) while P (f1g) and P (f1; 2g) remain unchanged.
The increase in P (f2g) induces a loss of customers for the separate admission ticket for public good 2 on two margins. One margin, represented by the darkly shaded area in the …gure, involves people who stop buying any admission ticket at all. The other margin, represented by the lightly shaded area in the …gure, involves people who switch from buying the separate admission ticket for public good 2 to buying the combination ticket. This latter group ends up paying P (f1; 2g) rather than P (f2g); so their switching causes total revenue from admission tickets to go up rather than down. This cross-e¤ect of the price P (f2g) on the demand for the bundle f1; 2g makes an increase in P (f2g) appear more attractive. Without this cross-e¤ect, under the independence assumption (4.6), elasticities considerations for setting P (f2g) would be the same as for setting p 2 under arbitrage-free pricing. 28 The cross-e¤ect makes an increase in the separate admission fee P (f2g) appear attractive, even when an increase in p 2 under arbitrage-free pricing is not.
These considerations suggest that, at least under the independence assumption, optimal price schedules should always involve some bundling. The following proposition, which is again inspired by Manelli and Vincent (2006 a), con…rms this notion for the case m = 2: For m > 2; unfortunately, the combinatorics of di¤erent bundles are so complicated that a similarly clear-cut result does not seem to be available. Proposition 4.2 Let m = 2; and assume that the density f takes the form f ( 1 ; 2 ) = f 1 ( 1 )f 2 ( 2 ). Assume further that, for i = 1; 2; the function
is nondecreasing. Then, for any Q >> 0, an optimal price schedule P satis…es P (f1; 2g) < P (f1g) + P (f2g):
In Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, the assumption that~ 1 ; :::;~ m are mutually independent should be interpreted as providing a focal point. The arguments of McAfee et al. (1989) indicate that the superiority of mixed bundling holds a fortiori if valuations are negatively correlated. Thus, one easily veri…es that the above comparison of elasticities considerations for setting the prices p 2 for admission to public good 2 and for setting the price P (f1; 2g) for the bundle f1; 2g remains valid if the conditional hazard rate f 2 (p 2 j 1 ) 1 F 2 (p 2 j 1 ) is a decreasing function of 1 : Whereas the independence assumption (4.6) had guaranteed that elasticities considerations concerning people who react to the price decrease by adding public good 2 to the things they want are the same in both settings, the monotonicity assumption on f 2 (p 2 j 1 ) 1 F 2 (p 2 j 1 ) enhances the di¤erence between the price elasticities of demand for the bundle f1; 2g and demand for admission to public good 2.
If it is actually possible to enforce combination tickets being more, rather than less, expensive than the sum of individual tickets, one gets an even stronger result. In this case, the arguments of McAfee et al. (1989) imply that, for generic taste distributions, the Ramsey-Boiteux solution is dominated by a price schedule that is not arbitrage free. If all price schedules are admitted, it could only be by a ‡uke that …rst-order conditions for the pricing of bundles are all satis…ed at the arbitrage-free price schedule that corresponds to the vector of Ramsey-Boiteux prices.
Whereas the preceding analysis has contrasted third-best allocations with allocations induced by price schedules, the reader may wonder about the relation between the latter and second-best allocations. For the multiproduct monopoly problem, the examples of Thanassoulis (2004) as well as Manelli and Vincent (2006 a, b) show that price schedules themselves are likely be dominated by more complicated schemes involving nontrivial randomization over admissions to the di¤erent public goods. Given that the formal structure of the second-best welfare problem is very similar to the monopoly problem, the lesson from these examples should apply in the current setting as well. 29 A focus on allocations that are induced by price schedules can be jus-ti…ed by the weakening of the renegotiation proofness condition that was mentioned in the preceding section. If the mechanism designer is unable to prevent side-trading, but "bundles" of admission tickets to di¤erent public goods can be prepared in such a way that "unbundling" is impossible, then an argument parallel to the one given before can be used to show that an allocation is renegotiation proof in this weaker sense and incentive-compatible if and only if it is induced by a price schedule. 30 An allocation that is induced by an optimal price schedule may thus be said to be 2:5 th best, i.e. optimal in the set of all feasible, incentive-compatible and weakly renegotiation proof allocations.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The "if"part of the lemma is an instance of the …rst welfare theorem. To prove the "only if"part, let (Q; c( ; ); 1 ( ; ); :::; m ( ; )) be a renegotiation proof allocation. For i = 1; :::; m; let^ i be the unique solution to the equation
hence, by (A.2) and (A.3),
one …nds that the claim of the lemma is established.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
The "if" part of the lemma is trivial. To prove the "only if" part, let (Q; c( ; ); 1 ( ; ); :::; m ( ; )) be a renegotiation proof and incentive-compatible allocation, and let v(:) be the associated expected-payo¤ function as given by (2.14) . By (2.14) , one has v(0) = C(0): Moreover, Lemmas 2.2 and 3.1, and (2.11) imply that for almost any 2 [0; 1] m , the function v(:) has …rst partial derivatives satisfying
where p 1 ; :::; p m are the prices given by Lemma 3. 
so (3.11) follows from (3.9) and (3.10).
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is trivial and is left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. By Proposition 3.3, Q 1 ; :::; Q m and p 1 ; :::; p m maximize (3.16) subject to (3.17) . For some 0 therefore, Q 1 ; :::; Q m and p 1 ; :::; p m maximize the Lagrangian expression
(A.12) Given that p i =^ i (p i ; Q i )Q i for all i; the problem of maximizing (A.12) with respect to Q 1 ; :::; Q m and p 1 ; :::; p m is equivalent to the problem of maximizing
with respect to Q 1 ; :::; Q m and^ 1 ; :::;^ m :
To prove that Q i > 0; it su¢ ces to observe that, for Q i = 0; (A.13) is independent of^ i ; and, for^ i < 1; at Q i = 0; (A.13) is strictly increasing in Q i : Any pair (Q i ;^ i ) with Q i = 0 is therefore dominated by the pair ("; 1 2 ); provided that " > 0 is su¢ ciently small.
Given that public-good provision levels must be positive, the …rst-order conditions for maximizing (A.13) are given as
for Q i and
for^ i ; with a strict inequality only if^ i = 0: With Q i > 0; (A.15) simpli…es to:
with a strict inequality only if^ i = 0:
The Lagrange multiplier must exceed one. Proof of Proposition 4.1. By contradiction, suppose that the …rst statement of Proposition 4.1 is false. Then there exist Q >> 0 and P such that P is arbitrage-free and, given Q; P maximizes (4.5) over the set of price schedules inducing individually rational and feasible allocations.
For any price schedule P; an allocation induced by P is individually rational if P (;) = 0: By (2.20), the allocation is also feasible if Z 
Thus P maximizes (4.5) over the set of price schedules P that satisfy P (;) = 0 and (A.18). For some 0 and some ; therefore, P maximizes the Lagrangian expression Z
Given that any price schedule P is characterized by the …nite list of numbers P (;); P (f1g); :::; P (fmg); :::; P (M ); it follows that, for any nonempty set J M; the …rst-order condition @ @P (J)
with equality unless P (J) = 0;
must be satis…ed at P = P : By an argument of Manelli and Vincent (2002) , 31 
with equality unless P (J) = 0:
I …rst show that, because P is arbitrage free, (A.22) implies the Ramsey-Boiteux …rst-order condition (3.19) . For any j, I de…ne J (j) := fJ M j j 2 Jg as the set of all sets J that contain public good j: Summation of (A.22) over J 2 J (j) yields
with equality unless P (J) = 0 for some J 2 J (j):
Because P is arbitrage free, one has [ J2J (j) A J (P ) = f 2 [0; 1] m j j ^ j g, [ J2J (j) B j J (P ) = [0; 1] m 1 ; and, for i 6 = j; [ J2J (j)\J (i) B i J (P ) = f i 2 [0; 1] m 1 j j ^ j g; where^ j = P (fjg) Q j : Thus (A.23) can be rewritten as
with equality unless^ j = 0.
Upon computing the integrals and cancelling terms involving f j (1) or f i (1); one can rewrite this condition as
with equality unless^ j = 0. This is identical with condition (A.16) in the proof of Proposition 3.4. The same argument as was given there shows that one must have > 1 and 1 >^ i > 0; and hence
for all j.
Because P is arbitrage free, for j = 1; :::; m; one also has A fjg (P ) =
Upon computing the integrals in (A. 26) , cancelling terms involving f j (1) and dividing by Q i6 =j F i (^ i ); one further obtains
By (A.24), it follows that
which is impossible because^ j < 1 and^ k > 0 for all k:
The assumption that the …rst statement of the proposition is false has thus led to a contradiction. Turning to the second statement of the proposition, the argument just given implies that, at the arbitrage-free price schedule P that induces a third-best allocation, the derivative of the Lagrangian (A.19) with respect to the singleton price P (fjg) is strictly positive. As for the bundle M , because P is arbitrage free, one has A M (P ) = Q m j=1 [^ j ; 1]; and, for i = 1; :::; m; B i M (P ) = Q j6 =i [^ j ; 1], so, at P = P ; the derivative of the Lagrangian (A. 19 ) with respect to the price P (M ) takes the form
Upon using (A.24) to substitute for ^ i f i (^ i ); i = 1; :::; m; one …nds that (A.28) is equal to
which is strictly negative because m > 1. The dominating price scheduleP in the vicinity of P may thus be chosen withP (M ) < P (M ); as well aŝ P (fjg) > P (fjg) for j = 1; :::; m:
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the proposition is false. For m = 2; let Q >> 0 and P be such that P is an optimal price schedule, given Q and P (f1; 2g) P (f1g)+P (f2g): Optimality of P implies that, for some 0 and some ; P satis…es the …rst-order condition (A.22). Feasibility implies that P (f1; 2g) > 0:
If P (f1; 2g) P (f1g) + P (f2g); one has A f1;2g (P ) = [ 1 ; 1] [ 2 ; 1]; where, for i = 1; 2; i := P (f1; 2g) P (fig): For J = f1; 2g; with P (f1; 2g) > 0; (A.22) then yields:
: (A.29)
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If P (f1; 2g) P (f1g) + P (f2g); one also has A f1g (P ) = f( 1 ; 2 )j 2 2 and 1 ^ 1 ( 2 )g;
where^ 1 ( 2 ) := P (f1g) + max( 2 P (f2g); 0): For J = f1g; therefore; (A.22) implies ( 1)
For 2 2 ; one haŝ 1 ( 2 ) P (f1g) + max( 2 P (f2g); 0) = P (f1g) + max(P (f1; 2g) P (f1g) P (f2g)); 0) = P (f1; 2g) P (f2g) = 1 :
Given the assumed monotonicity of the functions i ! i f i ( i ) 1 F i ( i ) ; it follows that (A.30) implies
By a precisely symmetric argument for the set f2g; one also has
: (A.32)
Upon combining (A.31) and (A.32) with (120), one obtains ( 1) 2( 1); which implies 1: By (A.31), it follows that i = 0 for i = 1; 2; hence P (f1; 2g) = 0; which is impossible if the cost K(Q) > 0 is to be covered. The assumption that P (f1; 2g) P (f1g) + P (f2g) thus leads to a contradiction and must be false.
B Appendix: Weak Renegotiation Proofness
In this appendix, I consider the possibility that the mechanism designer prepares bundles of admission tickets to the di¤erent public goods in such a way that participants are unable to unbundle them. In this case, an allocation will be an array In view of Lemma B.2, the problem of …nding an allocation that maximizes welfare over the set of allocations that are feasible, incentive-compatible, weakly renegotiation proof and individually rational is equivalent to the problem of …nding an optimal price schedule.
